Posted By Chris Nelder Share

Chris Nelder, a San Francisco-based writer-investor on energy, is the author of Profit from the Peak and Investing in Renewable Energy. He blogs at getrealist.com.

Shale gas fever has overtaken America, but we have seen this sort of mania before.

In 2003 and 2004, a "hydrogen economy" was touted as the Next Big Thing. The United States was poised to run its 240 million cars and trucks on it some day, and wean itself off of oil. California would lead the way, putting half a million hydrogen vehicles on the road and building 200 fueling stations by 2010. Today, after the expenditure of around $2 billion of public funds, the U.S. has just two-dozen fueling stations and 500 hydrogen vehicles, plus only modest progress in fuels cells. There is no longer mainstream discussion of a hydrogen economy.

Then Americans became drunk on ethanol. More than $20 billion in subsidies was spent over a three-decade period ending Dec. 31 that ultimately turned nearly 40 percent of the U.S. corn crop into less than 10 percent of the country's fuel needs by volume, and less than 7 percent by energy content. In 2009, the U.S. taxpayer subsidized 75 percent of the price of each gallon of gasoline replaced with ethanol.

Now the U.S. has gone batty for natural gas. President Barack Obama and key members of Congress have cited a humongous estimate for the natural gas supply supposedly possessed by the United States -- nearly 2,200 trillion cubic feet of the fuel, the equivalent of 379 billion barrels of oil, which if accurate would exceed the crude oil reserves of Saudi Arabia, and satisfy U.S. gas demand at current levels for around a century. Only, that widely published figure represents what are called "possible" reserves, not the more certain categories known as "proved" and "probable" -- gas that is more likely to be producible under current technological and market conditions. When discussing proved reserves, the U.S. Energy Information Administration says the U.S. possesses just one-twelfth of that volume, or 273 trillion cubic feet of gas, the equivalent of 47 billion barrels of oil. That is still a lot but, at the country's 2010 rate of consumption of 24 trillion cubic feet a year, it's just an 11-year supply. Even if we assume a very optimistic 50 percent recovery factor for the estimated 550 trillion cubic feet of probable gas, we would still have just a 31-year supply.

A lack of good data, in addition to an apparent bias toward optimistic data, underlies this perception gap. Consider a new, well-by-well analysis by Houston-based petroleum geologist Arthur Berman. Berman, a long-time doubter of mainstream gas estimates, writes that, contrary to popular belief, gas production is not growing under current conditions; instead, 80 percent of the country's shale gas production (pictured above, shale gas operation in Springville, Pa.) has flattened out or declined over the past year. Total U.S. gas production has been on an "undulating plateau" since the beginning of 2009, Berman says, as new shale gas output struggles to compensate for a 32 percent-per-year decline in conventional gas production. This picture is missing from the EIA's data because the U.S. agency bases its reporting on shale gas data only for 2008 and 2009, and does not do well-by-well sampling.

The main factor behind the flattening-out of production is that, with gas selling for well under $3 per thousand cubic feet, nearly all shale gas production has become unprofitable. Analyses by Range Resources, Berman and others finds that nearly all operators need at least $4 per thousand cubic feet to break even while drilling new wells in existing plays, and at least $8 when one includes all costs, including leasing of gas fields, overhead and debt service. Berman finds that the fully burdened break-even point for the top-producing play, the Haynesville Shale in Louisiana, is around $9 per thousand cubic feet. Recent research from Louisiana State University, featured in the Oil and Gas Journal, reached a similar conclusion: "The probability of incurring a negative [net present value] for Haynesville wells is real and significant."

In short, there is much reason to disbelieve the sustainability of shale gas production at current prices. Perhaps this is why all the EIA's multiple forecast scenarios in its 2011 Annual Energy Outlook assume a gas price of at least $5 per thousand cubic feet. The agency wholly disregards the economics of producing sub-$3-per-cubic-foot gas.

Accordingly, a growing parade of drillers has been sharply curtailing work on the gas patch, and shifting to the production of natural gas liquids, which might permit them to eke out a bit of profit. The result will be further declines in gas production, despite forecasts suggesting the opposite.

The public discussion one hears contemplates as much as a 40 percent increase in domestic natural gas demand, including the retrofitting of transport trucks and power generation to gas, and the export of up to a fifth of U.S. supply as liquefied natural gas.

While such export enthusiasm has prevailed, the EIA has undermined the idea: Three weeks ago, the agency reduced its estimate of U.S. gas resources by 42 percent, to 482 trillion cubic feet, which equates with a 20-year supply of unproved reserves. To illustrate what that means, an earlier EIA analysis had concluded that, with a slightly lower resource base of 423 trillion cubic feet, the U.S. could turn into a net natural gas importer by 2035.

The shale gas phenomenon is so new, and the data so thin, that one wonders at the wisdom of making long-term export decisions with perhaps irreversible consequences. The last two energy manias lived and died without a wisp of a memory. This one, if it goes wrong, may not be so benign.

Spencer Platt/Getty Images

 

BAKINETS

7:30 AM ET

February 13, 2012

annoying post

Maybe this is not fair given the limitations of the blog form, but I found this post truly annoying and pointless. FIRST, there is an overwhelming policy case against LNG exports even assuming $3 and 2200 tcf. One should make that case (which is based on the obvious logic of preventing relinkage between Henry Hub and European prices). It's unhelpful to link this argument to a skeptical take on shale. SECOND, who on earth is arguing prices will stay at $3 forever, or taking actions based on that assumption? Nobody. THIRD, If you are going to cite Berman, you should engage with his argument in more detail. This is not USA Today; this blog is read by a lot of energy folks, they will understand. Lined up against Berman you have not just an EIA analysis based on 2009 data -- you have everyone who has bought their way into US shale at high valuations, including BHP Billiton, Total, BP, Marubeni, Sinopec, and others. Maybe Berman is right, maybe he's wrong -- but this article basically says there's one Cassandra named Berman and leaves it at that.

 

CHRISNELDER

6:05 PM ET

February 13, 2012

@BAKINETS

This post was intended to be a short comment. If you follow the links to my earlier articles at SmartPlanet and Slate, you will find my detailed engagement with Berman's arguments. In addition to your policy case against LNG exports, I have explained why exporting LNG equal to 1/5 of our current demand is a bad move for the U.S. As for the big players buying into shale plays, my surmise (explained in the earlier posts) is that they are willing to hold those positions until prices make production profitable again. But that does not speak to the issue of the current flagging production or overstatement of resources.

 

PJCPJCPJC

8:09 PM ET

February 13, 2012

How could LNG exports

How could LNG exports possibly link Henry Hub to Eurpean prices?

It costs money to liqeuify, ship, and re-gas the gas. A lot of money. Like $1.5 or so, right?

So even if the US creates a large export capacity, one would export Henry Hub still trade at a $1.5 discount to Europe.

More likely, the LNG export capacity will be too small to drag Henry Hub up this worst case, and the US consumers will still enjoy a significant discount.

Finally, suppose Henry Hub was $8. Can you imagine how much higher the gas production would go? How many additional workers would be hired? How much additional taxes would be paid?

A booming export energy business is somehow "bad for America"? Exporting LNG has trade-offs, but if you're looking at job creation, massive LNG exports is probably a net win.

 

NICK GREALY

9:37 AM ET

February 13, 2012

Annoying Post 2

I've watched The Oil and The Glory move from a centrist sane view of shale to driving into the the ditch of denial lately. Vis The report of European shale earlier this month. It would be nice to have an update on that one: How Exxon, Marathon and San Leon have affirmed their drilling programs and in the last case talked about gas (and oil) flows.
Art Berman and his Galileo complex don't really belong here. Why no mention of his Peak Oil obsessions for example? Berman does the typical Oil Drum shtick of providing reams of information that only a petrophysicist can even recognise, which is meant to impress non experts that he knows what he is talking about.

I'm no petrophysicist, but I know a lot of people who are, and they they have no time for Berman. But of course, he explains that by them being in on the plot.

As BAKINETS points out: Maybe he is right. But if its Berman v Exxon, BP, Shell, Total, Statoil, Marathon, Chevron, Reliance, BHP, Petro China, ENI, Mitsui, Petronas, Sinopec and hundreds of smaller drillers and the service sector and the chemical industry: Then the only logical conclusion is that Galileo has been reincarnated as Berman or that he's wrong.

Mystified that on a Foreign Policy blog, Steve Levine seems to want to work against US interests via shale denial. Gazprom loves Berman too, they quote him very approvingly, If you don't know any US State people Steve, I can introduce you to provide some background on their views.

 

CHRISNELDER

6:14 PM ET

February 13, 2012

@NICK GREALY

He said - she said arguments don't interest me. I believe in data. Against Berman's highly transparent work, we have opaque official data and a host of companies who appear to be overpaying (under current gas prices) for positions in unprofitable plays. That sounds more like a speculative bubble, or perhaps a long-term gamble on future prices, than some sort of Galileo complex.

 

XENOPHON

9:37 PM ET

February 19, 2012

"Mystified that on a Foreign

"Mystified that on a Foreign Policy blog, Steve Levine seems to want to work against US interests via shale denial."

So this is what it's come to: articles that are less than consensus-optimistic on shale are "working against US interests" and examples of "shale denial?"

Sorry, but you're a sick pup. I don't know who is most accurate on their forecasts about shale gas/oil, but the last thing we need in that debate is the psychotic concept of "shale denial."

Your argument in this post is nothing more than that Berman is in a small minority and therefore writing about his views is a bad thing--"working against US interests." Why don't you get some of your "petrophysicist friends" to send in material to O&G instead of acting as though the fact that "they don't have time for [Berman]" constitutes an actual argument?

Your post makes me think I'm in a front row seat watching Ibsen's play, "An Enemy of the People."

 

BART889

4:28 PM ET

February 13, 2012

Pure falsehood

"Total U.S. gas production has been on an "undulating plateau" since the beginning of 2009,"

Utter nonsense. Production has been flat since December 2011 - that is, the last three months - because drilling peaked in September 2010, and pretty stable for a year thereafter.

Production began 2009 at 55.8 Bcf/d. It fell to 54 Bcf/d by the end of 2009 because there was a MASSIVE reduction in rig count in the first half of 2009 in response to the rapid crash in commodity prices in mid 2008.

But, since January 2010, production is up from 54 Bcf/d ti 64 Bcf/d in November 2010. Over that period, monthly production grew 18 times in 23 months.

Furthermore, Berman did not do a "well-by-well analysis", he took data from HPDI that was purchased and analyzed by Arc Financial.

Echoing the above comments, this isn't just Berman against the EIA and against every firm that is dropping real money on thee plays, it's also Berman against Wood Mackenzie, which has about 50 guys working full-time analyzing play-by-play data and trends, Berman against PIRA, Berman against CERA, Berman against Bentek, Berman against TPH, CS, BNPP, Macquarie, DB, BraCap and every other bank analyst out there. It's Berman against pretty much everybody who worls in the industry. The only people backing Berman up are people who don't work in the business and have some bizarre psychological attraction to doom-saying. Berman is the limiting outrider on the low end, he shouldn't be treated as the median observer.

Does the editor of this blog really think that he (and the blog) will benefit by being turned into another apocalyptic Oil Drum/Die-off peak oil crackpot site?

 

BART889

4:29 PM ET

February 13, 2012

Correction

to 64 Bcf/d in November 2011.

 

CHRISNELDER

7:29 PM ET

February 13, 2012

@BART889

It's difficult to respond to your data without knowing the source and how it's defined (Gross withdrawals? Marketed production? Dry production?). Your numbers don't seem to match up with Berman's or EIA's.

Berman shows the "undulating plateau" in his chart, which I discussed here: http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/energy-futurist/everything-you-know-about-shale-gas-is-wrong/341
In my interview with Berman for that piece, as I noted, he indicated that he had done original analysis of HPDI data.

Berman's own article was one of my sources, and has additional detail on the production data. You can find that here: http://www.theoildrum.com/node/8914

I am always open to seeing opposing views, provided they show their work and their data. Feel free to provide links to others' data so we have something to discuss.

 

PJCPJCPJC

7:51 PM ET

February 13, 2012

This doesn't look like a

This doesn't look like a "plateau since Jan 2009".

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_whv_a_epg0_vgm_mmcf_a.htm

This doesn't look like a "plateau since Jan 2009".

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_whv_a_epg0_vgm_mmcf_a.htm

I guess Berman has some way to game the numbers to get to his "plateau since Jan 2009" theory.

Chris - why can't we go off the EIA website and just look at the annual numbers?

A "plateau since Jan 2009" would imply that 2010 is about the same as 2009, not a ~4% increase. A 4% increase, if repeated annually, would double in 20 years. That's not a plateau.

 

CHRISNELDER

8:09 PM ET

February 13, 2012

@PJCPJCPJC

If you don't understand the argument about EIA's data set vs. Berman/HPDI's by now, then I can't help you.

I will say it's remarkable how persistent you are in showing up to every article I write, wherever it's published, to repeat the same snarky, unsubstantiated allegations, ignore the actual arguments I make while trying to sidetrack the conversation, and attempt to hijack every comment thread. Does someone pay you for your hard labors? I certainly hope so.

 

PJCPJCPJC

8:17 PM ET

February 13, 2012

clear fabrication

So you say "This picture is missing from the EIA's data because the U.S. agency bases its reporting on shale gas data only for 2008 and 2009, and does not do well-by-well sampling."

But this link has 2010 and 2011 data?

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9050us2m.htm

And it shows marketed production shooting upward!

This is a clear contradiction between your writing and a 5 minute google search?

I don't understand? Isn't this web-site vetted somehow? Mr. Levine, fact check this stuff a bit, please.

 

CHRISNELDER

9:22 PM ET

February 13, 2012

@PJCPJCPJC Correct, you don't understand

That link is for total marketed gas, not *shale* gas *production*. I provided the link to EIA's spotty shale gas data in my previous article. You appear to be going out of your way to misconstrue what's clearly on the page.

 

PJCPJCPJC

9:34 PM ET

February 13, 2012

seperating shale from total production

Seperating shale production from total production seems pointlesss to me, and probably to everyone else on this site.

Isn't the relevant data here total marketed US natural production?

The EIA is the most reputable source for this aggregate number, and it shows production going up, not plateauing.

If we take the EIA's aggregate numbers as correct, then we have to wonder where the increase is coming from, if not the shales.

If you are saying "the EIA's aggregate production numbers are wrong, by a long shot", then that's a very controversioal opinion and you've got an uphill fight getting people to buy it.

2 other posters besides me are calling you out on this one.

Why not just write a piece about how some shale investors are going to get burned. This "don't believe the EIA" bit, is weird and distracting, and I'm not the only one who thinks so.

 

BART889

2:16 AM ET

February 14, 2012

You want data?

My numbers are Lower-48 dry gas production, so I strip out Alaska data, since Alaska is not connected to the Lower-48 market in any way, then I strip out liquids and extraction losses. the result is gas that goes into pipelines and to consumers. The monthly data is EIA-914, which comes out on a 3-month delay. In addition to that I use pipeline scrapes to measure daily production and consumption in near real-time. Pipeline scrapes do not lie. Also, production and consumption are reconciled using the weekly storage report. I know what electricity loads are on a next-day basis, Genscape tells me which coal-fired plants are running, the NRC tells me how many nukes are running, the ACOE tells me how much hydro is being produced, whatever is left over is being used by gas plants. Residential and commercial gas consumption are strongly tied to population and heating/cooling degree days, the amount of gas used as pipeline fuel is a function of how much gas is flowing through the pipelines, which, once again, comes from the pipeline scrapes. From there it's pretty much a question of arithmetic. Guess what? My daily production and consumption models are verified against the EIA numbers when they come out, and they always cinch up pretty closely. The EIA just revised their 2010 production numbers down a little bit, and I predicted it because of my own models. But generally, the EIA is pretty good. The only area where they have problems is production in PA, which is a difficult state to nail because it's growing so quickly and the reporting requirements in that state are so lax compared to the rest of the country.

There is no "undulating plateau", (a phrase Berman borrowed from Yergin). Production declined slowly through 2009 as a response to the drilling cutbacks of early 2009, but between January 2010 and November 2011 it was basically a one-way escalator ride up. Jan 2011 was down because of the massive freeze-off event in TX/NM/OK, and there was a small dip at the end of August because of hurricanes, but that's it. This is one case where it is shockingly easy to show that Berman is making shit up out of the whole cloth.

Also, Berman's claim that Texas RRC data belies EIA data is wrong, since TRRC data is ALMOST ALWAYS revised upwards after the fact, usually because people don't get their reports in on time.

Oh, yeah, you can also look at gas production numbers reported by producers in their 10Q and 10K's, and you can also reconcile them with well-level production data from state government websites (the source of the HDPI dataset.) They all match up, because publicly traded companies know better than to lie on their SEC filings. They may hype forward-looking projections, but not verifiable data.

BTW, the Berman article you cite is basically a verbatim copy of an analysis Peter Tertzakian had published in the Calgary Herald about a month ago. There is no evidence that Berman has ever looked at the HPDI dataset. I have, and so have Wood Mackenzie and PIRA and CERA and so have analysts I know at BNPP and Credit Suisse and Barclays Capital and Goldman Sachs. And we all reach a wildly different conclusion to Berman. But please, stop saying that Berman has done a "new, well-by-well analysis". He is only citing work other people have done. If he's going to piggy-back on work done by a credible individual like Tertzakian, he should at least have the decency to give credit where it is due.

Berman also plays very loose with the definition of decline rates. Since a decline rate is a continuous variable, it is easy to overstate and misrepresent it when trying to put it in discrete terms. For instance, if a set of wells in producing 10 Bcf/d on Jan1, and the same set of wells is producing 8 Bcf/d on Dec 31 of the same year, then someone might call this a 20% decline rate, but if you want to maintain a steady production of 10 Bcf/d all year then 90% of your gas comes from incumbent wells, and 10% from new wells. If you bother doing the calculus you find that the continuous decline rate would be (1/365) bcf/(d^2), or 1 Bcf/d per year, or 10%. That is, a mathematically illiterate person (or a math-literate person who is interested in being misleading) can easily overstate decline rates. So when Berman says that 22 Bcf/d must be replaced every year, he is using point data to multiply the decline rate by two. The average amount of gas that comes from a typical annual cohort of wells in its first year is about 10-11 Bcf/d averaged over that year.

As it turns out, decline rates in shale plays haven't been nearly as bad as we thought they would be a couple of years ago. The 80% decline rates we thought we would have in the Haynesville and Marcellus haven't showed up, and as a result, total production has been stronger than what most people, myself included, forecasted. When I have to get up and tell my CEO why gas prices are so low, and why I didn't spot this a year or two ago, its because I was assuming decline rates would be higher. My one and only instance of paying serious attention to Berman ended up causing my forecasts to get screwed up and caused me no shortage of grief with my bosses and the guys on my trading desk.

He fooled me once. Once, and I only once, I assure you. I really hope he's right, because I'd really like to see the price of gas to increase. It would help my company's stock price, it would help my bonus, it would make my encounters with my CEO and CRO and COO and CFO and director of gas trading a lot more enjoyable. But there is too much evidence to the contrary.

 

PJCPJCPJC

3:45 AM ET

February 14, 2012

Thanks Bart!

@BART889

Thanks for a reality based analysis. Maybe you can guest post here and Mr. Levine can redeem himself.

How accurate would you say the numbers on this website are for 2011 data?

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9050us2m.htm

10% too high? 5% too high? Less than 5%? More than 10%?

Just curious. Be nice to get some real (non-Bermanized) info here, just for fun.

 

CHRISNELDER

4:57 AM ET

February 14, 2012

Good data

Thanks Bart for an intelligent and informed comment. If you are willing to share your data with me, I'd be interested in having a look at it. It's the dearth of good and recent data which makes Berman's argument plausible. If you are correct, I'd be very interested in seeing the proof.

 

BART889

3:43 PM ET

February 14, 2012

HPDI versus EIA

You state that there is some disconnect between the HPDI data and the EIA data because the EIA does not use HPDI. This is false. Do yourself a favor and read up on the methodology behind the EIA 914 report, and you will discover the connection.

What people in the industry know is that the HPDI dataset is usually pretty unreliable for the last 6-12 months because it is based upon reporting to state agencies, and because most state agencies do not have any sort of punitive mechanism to enforce timely reporting, a lot of companies, especially small-time producers, do not file production reports in a timely manner. The EIA takes HPDI data, it combines that with data that is directly filed by companies to the EIA (who do have a punishment mechanism), and they estimate production based upon both. And they usually do a pretty good job, with first reports usually not being revised by more than a couple of percent by the time final reconciliations are made a couple of years later.

The idea that one guy working in his basement somewhere in Texas has a better, more reliable data set than the rest of the gas industry does not pass the smell test. As I said in another post, it is pretty easy to verify the EIA production data using independent measures such as pipeline flow data, storage operator reports, power plant fuel consumption filings (using continuous emissions monitoring equipment) and utility billing data.

For Berman to be right, and for everything else to be wrong requires a massive conspiracy involving tens of thousands of people in several federal government agencies, every state government, every utility commission and thousands of companies in several different industries all co-ordinating with the gas producers to cook the books.

That's what Berman's beliefs are built on. To Nelder and LeVine I say this: if you want to align yourself with that clown, be my guest, but don't expect yourselves or this website to be taken seriously by rational people if you choose that route.

 

CHRISNELDER

11:48 PM ET

February 15, 2012

@BART889

Bart, I'd like to have a fuller conversation with you about your views and data. If you are agreeable, please contact me by email: chris (at) getreallist (dot) com

 

STEVE LEVINE

5:26 PM ET

February 13, 2012

Art Berman, peak oilers and shale gas

Chris Nelder presents his own views as a guest columnist, and I think will respond personally. But it is reasonable to note that in boomtimes, facts become exaggerated, bubbles become created and unreality takes hold. There is not necessarily safety in numbers. Quite apart from the lessons of the recent financial and technological fiascoes, look at Baku in the early- to mid-1990s. Almost every major oil company in the world took out expensive offshore leases with the conviction that there had to be more large oil reservoirs and not just the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli supergiant. BP and Total ended up succeeding with large gas fields, but everyone else -- Exxon, Shell, Eni, Chevron and so on -- failed. Consider Mukluk in Alaska. The history of the oil patch is boom and bust -- everyone piles in because they cannot afford not to take the risk in case there is a new North Slope. In U.S. shale, we are seeing a correction. There is a pullback, reflecting prices to be sure, but also a reassessment of fresh data. Shale gas is real. But we are watching companies make the hard choices on their scarce investment dollars.

 

PJCPJCPJC

1:28 AM ET

February 14, 2012

Give me a break

Nelder is saying the EIA's production numbers are wrong ... not just a little wrong but wrong by 10-20%.

He doesn't have the courage to state this clearly - but the implication is clear enough. Nelder says it's been a plateau for 3 years, the EIA says otherwise.

Tap dancing around "shale production versus total production" is nonesense. Either the EIA is reasonably accurate here or they aren't. If the EIA is accurate, then where is the increase coming from if not shales. If the EIA is so far off, then that should be the headline. Failing to track marketed production to within 10-20% would be a big snafu.

Sorry, this whole blarney is beneath the FP. This is site is supposed to have real information, not conspiracy theories.

At the least, maybe you can guest post a rebuttal from someone at the EIA, to address their alleged incompetence.

 

BART889

3:46 AM ET

February 14, 2012

Not a bust, but a correction

We are watching producers attempt to rein in booming production that has completely overwhelmed the capability of the demand side to consume all of the gas being brought to market.

People don't take more hot showers or run their furnaces more just because gas is cheap. Factories cannot increase maximum output capacity in the short run just because one of several inputs (gas) drops in price. Gas fired power plants are capable of running more at the expense of coal but only to a point, after which the price of coal drops until it is cheaper than gas, which is happening now because coal burns are down about 20% year on year.

Shale gas is a victim of its own success, and we are in the process of seeing a correction of an overshoot that is common to many growth industries. But as soon as demand starts to catch up, as the new steel mills and fertilizer and ethanol and polyethylene plants get built, and as the oil-burning houses in Maine and apartment blocks and hospitals and schools in NYC convert to gas, and as more coal-fired power plants get forced into retirement by CSAPR and MATS and 316(b) and CCR disposal regs and carbon standards and the ozone NAAQS, and when Cuomo forces Indian Point into retirement and the Californians pull a Germany and shut down their nukes, and Vermont Yankee and Oyster Creek go off-line, and more dams in the northwest get dynamited, and when Cheniere and Spectra and Dominion and the Canadians build their LNG export terminals, then gas will get back up above $5 (maybe in 2014 or 15, or maybe 16).

But when that happens we will see the rigs start to move back into the Barnett and Haynesville, and production will have no trouble ramping up to meet demand. We're probably facing a $5 ceiling for at least the next decade (with, of course, short-term excursions above that point.)

 

CHRISNELDER

5:05 AM ET

February 14, 2012

Re: Not a bust, but a correction

Thanks Bart, then we are agreed that a large demand increase is in the making. I am concerned that overall EURs for some of these plays would make it difficult to meet new, structural demand with 20-year lifespans (like LNG export terminals & power plants), particularly if your forecast of a $5 ceiling for a decade is true AND if the analyses showing that operators need a break-even price of around $4 (for point-forward) or significantly better (full-cycle) are correct. What's your view on the EURs of the various plays, and of the "non-core" potential that remains (esp. a decade down the line) in older plays like the Barnett?

 

PJCPJCPJC

7:10 PM ET

February 13, 2012

Art Berman's not-so-glorious history predicting shale gas

Art Berman has been screaming at shale gas for a long time now, his face growing redder and more contorted as the production numbers, market valuations, and overall economic output keep going up.

Here is one of my favorite Art Berman quotes.

"If shale operators cannot substantially reduce their costs, I doubt that most of them can survive a year or so more of low prices"

http://www.energybulletin.net/node/49342

This is from June 2009. So???. It'ss been two and a half years of low prices since then. Let's see those shale operators that have failed to survive.

My hunch is that Berman (and Nelder, who seems to base his entire contrarian position on Berman) are oblivious to the oil and gas co-production of shale plays. Some shales are dry. Some are wet. The latter produce oil, and oil-price-linked NGLs, along with gas. For these plays, the gas can be given away and the operators still run a profit.

Hence, gas production can remain high even in the face of low gas prices.

Moreover, gas prices will go up in the future. The question is how much gas can be produced at $4.50 or $5, not how much can be produced at $2.50 or $3. The former prices is still quite reasonable, and will be supported by the economy for many, many years.

Finally, this is relatively new technology. The resource estimates are in flux. Even if the US production comes in at the low end, the shale resources in Canada (which are barely scratched at this point) will insure natural gas is reasonably priced in N. America for decades.

And whats going to happen when shales outside N. America start fracking in earnest? Does anyone really believe the Marcellus, Haynesville, Eagle Ford, Bakken, etc are all on-offs, peculiar to the United Sates? No, no-one with any brains believes that. Despite Santorums belief that shale is a gift to the US from god, shale energy is really a technological breakthrough similar to that which created the US oil-boom 70 years ago. This is a "drilling and mapping" technique based revolution, and it will play out over the globe.

But the point is that the US EIA estimate is not gospel. The industry has been making a hash of all government estimates for the last 5-10 years. The current shale production is exceeding what even the pie-eyed optimists were predicting 5 years ago.

Who has the credibility at this point --- the industry, or Art "I doubt most of them can survive" Berman?

 

JAMES_MCMURTRY

9:10 PM ET

February 13, 2012

Natural gas production since 2009

"Total U.S. gas production has been on an "undulating plateau" since the beginning of 2009, Berman says".

This is just not true (As other posters have tried to correct).

I work in the natural gas industry. US production is up both in 2010 and 2011.

We can argue about whether or not this increase is good for the industry, or whether it will fall back in 2012, but the 2010 and 2011 numbers are on the books.

The EIA numbers are clear. They show meaningful increase in both gross withdrawls and marketed production through 2009, 2010 and 2011.

 

STEVE LEVINE

1:51 PM ET

February 14, 2012

Note to PJCPJCPJC

I have allowed you to air your views in a number of comments -- the most by far of anyone on this particular post. Please collect your thoughts in one or two remarks before pushing the button. In addition, given the nature of your attacks, you ought to identify yourself.

 

PJCPJCPJC

6:21 PM ET

February 14, 2012

independent investor

I am just an independent investor who is a fan of the shale gas story.

I am not going to put my name here because my brother is a somewhat well know law enforcement officer and my name is very unusual. Throwing my name on boards isn't going to accomplish anything but jam him up.

But I'm not paid to post nor do I work for any oil and gas company. I'm happy to contact you privately if you are somehow concerned about this.

Feel free to remove my supposedly "snarky" posts if you feel that serves some sort of purpose.

Did anyone post here in support of Nelder? Or of Berman? Bart99 essentially called Berman a conspiracy theorist, better junk his posts as well.

Look, if the Berman's and the Nelders of the world want to stay in their playground on the peak-oil and doomer-die-off sites, that's fine by me. But it's atrocious for supposedly mature and adult new sites to casually imply that the 6 to 24 month EIA production numbers are off by 20%-25%. To do so is to imply that the EIA is either incompetent or colluding with some inside conspiracy. That sort of nonesense is beneath FP and frankly it's beneath you Mr. Levine.

Would you print an author that casually mentioned that Kerry actually collected 55% of the popular vote in the 2004 election (and here is some deep analysis that proves it)? I doubt it.

Put some correction or at least some counterpoint to that one paragraph and the rest of the post isn't outrageous. A reasonable counterpoint to the pro-shale hysteria is well deserved, but don't throw in the conspiracy theory and expect us to swallow it.

 

Steve LeVine is the author of The Oil and the Glory and a longtime foreign correspondent.

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